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This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO
compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the
competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate
banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on
147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that
competitive corporate control markets (i.e.,whereinterstate banking is permitted) require talented
managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-
performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not
permitted.Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the
proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a
managerial talent market --thatis. one which matches the level and sflcture of compensation
with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, much attention has been focused on whether managers indeed
maximize shareholder wealth. Beginning with seminal works by Berle and Means (1932)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976), researchers have addressed the agency costs incurred by
the separation of ownership and control. Many devices have been suggested to help align
the incentives of the managers with the interests of shareholders, including such devices as
high corporate leverage (Jensen, 1986), more effective monitoring by the board of directors
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Weisbach, 1988), and
managerial compensation.
Managerial compensation (more specifically, chief executive officer compensation) has
come under increasing scrutiny in the popular press. On one side of the debate are critics
who suggest that CEO compensation is not related to performance and is largely
"excessive." Suggestions have ranged from capping CEO pay to making pay a prescribed
multiple of the lowest worker's salary. On the other side of the debate are proponents of
moderate reform of the current executive compensation system. For example, in a recent
article in Business Week, Peter T. Chingos, a compensation consultant at KPMG Peat
Marwick, comments that high pay reflects the limited number of executives who can run
large organizations successfully, stating:
We're reaching hysterical levels of concern. It's more of a knee-jerk reaction and a
paranoia. There are clear ezamples of abuses out there ...butthey make up only a
small minorityHow many Michael Eisners are there in the world? Companies
have to pay a premium for business luminaries. (March 1992, page 56)
We use the banking industry to examine these conflicting views in whether CEO
compensation is excessive or used to attract the requisite managerial talent.
Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has been examined empirically by Jensen
and Murphy (1990a), Murphy (1985,1986), Rosen (1992), Ba.rro and Barro (1990), Joskow,
Rose, and Shepard (1993), and Houston and James (1992) who find a positive relationship
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betweenpay and performance for samples of publicly-held corporations. Jensenand
Murphy (1990a) employ first-differences in shareholder wealth and the pay of chief
executive officers (CEOs) and find a significant positive relationship between pay and
performance. They find the sensitivity between pay and performance to be small, however
--a$3.25 change in CEO wealth per $1,000changein shareholder wealth. They attribute
this small sensitivity to public and private political forces influencing the managerial
compensation market, given that managerial compensation is highly visible and attracts
"implicit regulation" that truncates the upper tail of managerial compensation. Murphy
(1985) also finds a positive relationship between pay and performance, whereas
Murphy(1986) finds that the pay-performance sensitivity is negatively influenced by CEO
experience. These results are confirmed by Barro and Barro (1990) using a sample of
commercial banks. Joskow, Rose, and Shepard (1993) examine the differences in CEO
compensation between regulated firms (not including banks) and unregulated firms, and
find that regulated firms have lower levels of CEO compensation while offering
compensation packages that are less sensitive to CEO performance. Houston and James
(1992) compare banks with nonbanking firms, and find no evidence of greater
compensation-performance sensitivity in banks than in nonbanking firms. In addition,
they find that banks are less reliant on managerial stock options and ownership than
nonbanks, and no differences in CEO turnover rates between banking and nonbanking
firms. Accordingly, those authors suggest that the compensation arrangement does not
reward bank CEOs for taldng excessive risks —whichis inherent in the fixed-rate deposit
insurance contract offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
While most of the previous academic research has examined CEO compensation in
industrial firms, only Barro and Barro (1990) and Houston and James (1992) analyze CEO
compensation in commercial banks. This paper extends existing studies by examining the
effect of the market for corporate control on both the levels and structure of CEO
compensation in commercial banks. Banking is an industry where some variations of the
corporate control market can be easily identified. In particular, the bank corporate control
market is defined by the regulations legislated by each state, and is largely influenced by
whether banks from other states are allowed to compete in local banking markets.
Historically, most states did not allow mergers or any sort of branching activity across
states, and the McFadden Act of 1927 required national banks to conform to state
branching restrictions. Interstate banking became more widespread in the 1980s, when a
number of states broadened the boundary restrictions that had originally been imposed on3
theindustry. Interstate banking legislation introduced in many states allowed banks from
out-of-state to acquire banks in their state. This change effectively made the bank market
for corporate control more competitive by reducing or eliminating geographical restrictions
along county or state lines.
Accordingly, we examine if more competitive environments increase the skills required
of CEOs to manage in them. We use interstate bank regulation as a proxy for the
competitiveness level of the environment in which banks operate. Analyzing the effects of
the changes in regulation on the level and structure of CEO pay is analogous to examining
whether talented managers in more competitive environments are appropriately rewarded.
That is, the less strict is interstate regulation, the higher the level of competitiveness, the
more capable the CEO required to manage, and therefore the higher the level and
responsiveness of pay. We focus on only one element of regulation, namely interstate
banking. Presumably, other forms of regulation also changed in the 1980s (our sample
period), but we restrict our analysis to one form of regulation that put pressure --viathe
market for corporate control --ona manager's need to perform. The interstate regulation
data exhibit both cross-section and time-series variation in our sample of banks, allowing
us to test whether changes in regulation influence both the level °f pay and the pay-
performance relationship.
Consequently, we analyze the managerial talent hypothesis, which suggests that banks
have to compete for CEOs in a competitive labor market. Compensation acts as an
equilibrating mechanism to match talented managers with the competitiveness of their
environment. Therefore, talented CEOs in competitive environments are awarded higher
levels of compensation. In addition, CEOs in competitive markets are likely to have a
compensation structure that is more responsive to bank performance than CEOs in
protected banking markets (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). We also test whether CEO
turnover increased after interstate banking legislation was introduced. The talent
hypothesis is explained in more detail in Section 3.
In addition, we use panel data in our empirical work. in an important paper, Jensen
and Murphy (1990a) eliminate the implicit heterogeneity among firms in panel data, using
first-differences to examine the relationship between compensation and performance. To
analyze the effects of regulation, we use a fixed-effects model that control for bank-specific
omitted variables (or, in separate specifications, CEO-specific omitted variables) that vary
over banks (vary over CEOs). Civen that most of the sample had restrictive interstate
banking laws at the beginning of our sample period and had deregulated by the end of our4
sampleperiod, we estimate our fixed-effects models with and without year dummies. We
find that CEO compensation and performance (measured by shareholder wealth) are
positively related in our sample of commercial banks, supporting the view that more
competitive environments require CEOs with higher talent who have to be given higher
levels of compensation. Further, we find that competitive corporate control environments,
in which interstate banking is permitted, require talented managers whose compensation-
performance relationship is stronger than for managers in environments where interstate
banking is not permitted. We also find that the proportion of total compensation in the
form of such performance-related components as equity ownership and stock options went
up significantly after interstate deregulation. In addition, CEO turnover increased
substantially after deregulation. Taken together these results suggest that interstate
banking deregulation had an impact on both the level and structure of CEO compensation
in a manner consistent with the managerial talent hypothesis.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our definitions of
compensation, performance, and bank size. The effect of interstate regulation on the level
of compensation and on the compensation-performance relationship is explained in Section
3. Section 4 describes the data and the variables used in the analysis. We describe our
empirical tests and results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Compensation, performance, and size
In this section we describe the definitions of compensation, performance and bank size
that we follow. As the literature on compensation has grown, various definitions of
compensation and performance have been used by different studies. We describe below our
choice of compensation and performance measures.
2.1. Compensation
There are many mechanisms by which compensation policy provides value-increasing
incentives to improve a CEO's performance. These mechanisms can be classified into
performance-based bonus and salary, stock ownership, stock options, and performance-
based dismissal actions. We employ two definitions of CEO compensation. Our first
definition includes the dollar value of a CEO's salary and bonus in the current year only.
The second definition is the CEO's total wealth invested in the bank; and also includes
the value of equity ownership in the bank and the value of stock options granted. We use
year-end stock prices to calculate the value of equity that a CEO holds directly in the5
bank.To price the stock options, we use the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model
assuming continuously paid dividends (Noreen and Wolfson, 1981; Murphy, 1985; Jensen
and Murphy, 1990a). The dollar value of options is calculated as:
N1 [5 t(D) —xC<'"(D—o 47)]
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N1 is the number of options granted in year t at exercise price X. We assume that each
option has a ten-year maturity (as in Houston and James, 1992). 5 is the year-end stock
price net of the present value of dividends paid. We estimate a, the standard deviation of
stock returns in the previous twelve-month period, and use the interest rates on the
constant maturity ten-year Treasury bonds in year t as the relevant risk-free rate r. {'(-)
isthe cumulative standard normal distribution function. Regarding performance-based
dismissal actions, studies such as Coughian and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and
Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990a), and Murphy and
Zimmerman (1991) have found a negative relationship between the net-of-market firm
performance and theprobabilityof managerial turnover. These findings suggest that
managers are more likely to leave after bad years than after good years and are disciplined
by the credible threat of dismissal. As this issue is not the focus of our study, we do not
include the threat of dismissal in our definition of compensation.
2.2.Perfonnance
Principal-agent problems suggest that the compensation of the manager should be
related to his or her actions so as to align the insurance motive of the manager with the
wealth-maximizing incentive of the shareholder. Consequently, market movements that
have less to do with a manager's actions should be excluded from his or her performance
measure. On the one hand, relative performance appears to be a significant determinant of
compensation --asshown by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), who find a positive
relationship between compensation and the net-of-market returns, and by Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), who find a negative relationship between average industry returns and
compensation. On the other hand, Antle and Smith (1986), Murphy (1985), and Barro and6
Barro(1990) find that relative performance does not matter. Given that we examine a
sample of commercial banks, where market movements (probably) affectthe sample
uniformly, we analyze measures of performance using individual bank returns only.
Although there is little ambiguity that CEO compensation is related to performance, a
debate has occurred as to which measure of performance, stock market returns or
accounting returns, is more informative for executive incentives. Whereas Jensen and
Murphy (1990a) and Murphy (1985) confine their definition of performance to stock
returns (and different transformations thereof), some studies have used accounting
numbers as the relevant measure of performance (see, e.g., Kostiuk, 1986). Given the
potential for misrepresentation in accounting numbers and the inherent overstatement of
value (present in the book-value accounting of bank loans) in a commercial bank's balance
sheet, we restrict our analysis to stock market measures.
2.3.Size
Anumber of empirical studies (see Ciscell and Carroll, 1980, for a survey) have found
a positive relationship between firm size and compensation, motivating theoretical studies
dating back to Simon (1957) and more recently to Rosen (1982,1992). Rosen analyzes the
firm as a hierarchical control structure with the CEO at the top: The CEO's every action
multiplies over his or her "scale of operations," allowing him or her to accrue rents in a
competitive equilibrium. Consequently, a competitive labor market allocates more
talented senior executives to larger firms since the marginal productivity of their actions is
magnified across the lower levels of the hierarchy. This hypothesis suggests that we should
expect a positive relationship between size and compensation. However, because of the
potential correlation between size and performance, many studies (see, e.g., Jensen and
Murphy, 1990a; Murphy, 1985, 1986) have not included size in their set of regressors.2 We
include size as a regressor in our panel estimation to examine whether more rapidly
growing banks have CEO's with higher levels of compensation. We test whether our
estimated fixed-effects are correlated with a bank's asset size.
3. The effect pf interstate revilation on the level of CEO pay and the pay-performance
relationship
Banking is an industry in which regulation plays a major and relatively easily
identified role (see, e.g.,thegeneral discussion in Hubbard, 1994, Chapter 14). We focus
2iii.sue ii dj,c,sned.4 .ome length in Ciscdli and Carroll (1980) .ad Dunlevy (1985).7
on one important component of bank regulation, namely, interstate banking. Geographic
restrictions on expansion by banks particularly across state lines have long been part of
the U.S. banking system. The McFadden Act of 1927 defined banking markets as
statewide by aliowing national banks to branch within the geographical limits permitted
to state chartered banks. However, some banks overcame these restrictions with the use of
multi.bank holding companies. If a state did not allow a bank to open a branch, the bank
could form a (multi-bank) holding company which acquired a bank across state lines. The
Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Act of 1956 plugged this loophole by specifying
that the Federal Reserve Board may not approve an application by a bank holding
company (BHC) to acquire five percent of the voting shares of interest in all, or
substantially all, of the aspects of any bank located outside of the holding company's
home state.3 To avoid conflicts with states' rights, the Douglas Amendment allowed a
BHC to acquire a bank located outside its (BHC's) home state provided the target bank's
state specifically allowed it.
The state boundary restriction for bank expansion has changed considerably since 1980
with a number of states (49 out of 50 as of 1994) passing some type of interstate banking
law --i.e.,exploiting the states' rights loophole of the Douglas Amendment. In June 1985,
interstate acquisition and mergers were fully legitimized when the Supreme Court ruled in
Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors4 that "State statutes ...complywith the
Douglas Amendment and they do not violate ...clause(s) of the U.S. Constitution."
According to this ruling, a state could say nothing and thus prevent entry by any out-of-
state BHCs or it could specifically allow out-of-state BHCs to acquire or establish in-state
banks to the same extent as could in-state BUCs. Thus, every state had to choose its tic
novo entry and acquisition regulations. With this case, more states passed interstate
banking laws. A number of states now belong to what is referred to as interstate regional
compacts. A few states have reciprocal relationships with other states in a given region,
while some allow national entry or have a specified date past by which nationwide entry is
permitted. From the above description, we assume that allowing interstate banking
greatly increases the number of participants in the bank's corporate control market,
resulting in a more competitive banking environment. Takeovers are credible disciplining
devices that prevent managers from entrenching themselves and increasing their
compensation above competitive levels. Accordingly, we examine if deregulation (t.e.,
3TitIe12 US Code Section 1842 (d).
1O5S. a. 2545, 1985.B
interstatebanking)hada significant impact on both the level and structure of bank CEO
compensation.
Under the managerial talent hypothesis, more competitive markets in which interstate
banking is permitted require managers with greater skills or talent.5 Takeovers are
credible disciplining devices that prevent poorly performing managers from entrenching
themselves. Hence, banks in states where interstate banking is permitted attracts
managers that can perform with the "credible threat" mechanism of a competitive, well-
functioning corporate control market. Accordingly, a higher level of compensation is
required to attract more talented managers to the more competitive environment (see,
e.g., the discussion in Peltzman, l993).6?
Accordingly,in more competitive banking environments, CEOs would have to perform
or be fired. Consequently, one would expect CEO turnover to increase due to the
increased competitive environment caused by state deregulation. Many banks would have
to increase their managerial talent commensurate with their new operating environment.
We now describe the expected impact of deregulating interstate banking restrictions on
the structure of managerial compensation under the managerial talent hypothesis. For
example, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) explain in the context of the declining trend in the
last decade of Harvard Business School students to enter traditional corporate careers (as
opposed to investment banking, business law, and consulting careers with their higher
pay-performance relationships) "A highly sensitive pay-for-performance system will cause
high-quality people to self-select into a company" (page 44). The talent hypothesis
suggests that a CEO in a less regulated environment would have a compensation contract
structured so that a more significant component of his or her remuneration comes from
equity ownership and stock option grants. This compensation scheme allows the talented
5Sznitl,and Watts (1992) propese the TMinvestment opportunity seC hypothesis, which ha. some similarities to our
talent hypothesis. They argue that firm, with greaser investment opportunities employ more skilled executives who have to
be givenboth• higher level of pay and a more pronounced pay-performance relationship. Contra.ting a sample of
regulatedfinnsfrom• sample of unregulated firms, theyfindstrong evidence for their hypothesis. Given thatderegulating
restrictivebanking environments increases banks'investment opportunity set,the Smith-Wattshypothesis issimilarin
spirit to our talent hypothesis.
611 the managerial talent required in the two environments were thesame, one would observe a migration of CEO.
from the more regulated environment (who have lower levris of pay) to the tess regulated environment (who have higher
Levels of pay). We found no evidence that this migration occurred in our sample.
71t ts possible that differences in the level of compensation sad the pay.perfonnaacerelationshipbetween r,nns in
regulated and unregulated industries reflect political constraints on compensation (as argued, e.g., by Joskow, Rose, and
Shepard, 1993). It is, in genersl, difficult to distinguish this explanation fron, the managerial talent hypothesis (see also
Peltzmaa, 1993) that regulated and unregulated firms compete for CEO. of different abilities.9
manageroperating in the competitive environment to be better paid when he or she
performs well.Consequently,with the greater possibility that CEO actions can enhance
profitability, the talentedmanagerin markets in which interstate banking is permitted
may prefer to have compensation more strongly tied to performance than a manager in
markets in which interstate banking is not permitted.8
A possible alternative to the talent hypothesis is the following: Aligning CEO pay with
bank performance introduces a higher risk in the compensation contract. One might then
argue that managers in restrictive banking environments do not have much risk in their
contract (since they have a lower sensitivity to pay) and, therefore lower levels of pay.9
Risk-averse managers.. which given their undiversified human and financial capital in the
bank seems an reasonable assumption --would,however prefer to have their compensation
contracts to be less sensitive to performance in the riskier interstate banking environment.
This argument suggests an inverse relationship between the risk of the banking
environment and the risk of the CEO's compensation. Accordingly, CEOs in deregulated
banking markets would prefer to have a diminished pay-performance sensitivity under this
risk-differential hypothesis, exactly opposite of the higher pay-performance sensitivity
suggested by the managerial talent hypothesis. We provide evidence on this alternative
hypothesis in Section 4.
4. DaM sourca and variables used in the analysis
4.1. Date description
We obtained data for the compensation variables from the annual proxy statements
filed by banks with the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1981 to 1990. These
8Theimplication of a weaker pay-perfonnance relationship in markets with restrictive interstate banking regulation
implicitly a.sumes that managerial COntracts are not optimal in the more regulated enviroamenta. If the contracts were
optimal, deregulation (of the restrictive corporate control market) would decease the need for a strong pay-performance
relationship to align managerial and shareholder interest.; since the corporate control market, would substitute for strong
pay.performs.nc. sensitivities. What pasta suFj-opUn,al labor contracts to exist in these regulated environment.? One
possibility is that CEOs in restricted banking markets have grease political prsurn on account of closer supervision by
their state banking regulator.. This constant regulasoiy oversight might hinder CEO. from raising their level, of
compensation even when the bank performs well. In addition, restrictive Interstate banking legislation might be highly
correlated with other measures of regulatory supervision by the state banking authoritie, such a. required levels of
community leading, dc. Consequently, our measure of CEO performance — cession of shareholder wealth — Is not
necessarily the sole metric by which CEO. are evaluated by banking regulators. Stockholder. who privately prefer an
optimal compensation scheme might be willing to trade for reduced regulatory stringency In other areas. However, we do
not test for these possibilities explicitly, but only propose them as potential reasons for a lesser pay.performance sensitivity
under regulation.
9We estimated the standard deviations of bank returns before and after Interstate bsnking deregulation and found no
significant differences.10
compensationdata were then matched with balk performance data. Each bank's yearly
stock return is calculated from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)stock
return file, and all other bank-specific data (e.g., asset size, annualdividends paid) from
Standard and Poor's Bank Compustat. We obtained the 1981 to 1990 interest rates onthe
ten-year constant maturity Treasury bonds from the Economic Reportto the President
1993. We selected a longitudinal sample in order to examine banks that were tradedand
had compensation data available for a number of years. Many of the banks are not traded,
restricting our sample. The final sample consists of 147 banks, most of whichhave a
complete ten years of data (1980-1989); see Table 1. More specifically, we have 1202bank
CEO data points, as data for a few banks is missing for some years. The dummy for bank
regulation was created using information from Golembe and Holland (1986) and Amel
(1991))° All monetary variables are adjusted for inflation and represent constant (1989)
dollars. These 147 banks are from 36 different states plus the District of Columbia and
capture substantial time variations in the interstate banking variable.
4.2. Variables
We use two definitions of a bank CEO's compensation as our dependent variable. The
first definition includes the CEO's salary and bonus in the current year only." The second
definition includes the value of equity stock owned in the bank and the value of options
granted to the CEO. The compensation variables are in units of thousand dollars. As in
Jensen and Murphy (1990a), performance is measured by shareholder wealth, defined as
the stock returns earned during the year, times the price at the beginning of the year,
times the number of shares outstanding and is expressed in units of hundreds of millions of
dollars. We expect the shareholder wealth variable to be positively related to
compensation. To examine the possible effects of bank regulation on compensation we
include a proxy for interstate entry barriers introduced by state banking regulation. The
Colembe and Holland (1986), and Amel (1991) have listed the char lariat-ia of each state'. interstate bank
regulation. We converted their desaiption into. dummy variable based on the restrictiveness of the legislation.
1t-We also included as compensation th. variable for other payments received by the CEO. obtained from Forbes.
Thesepayment. include long-tam compensation plans, thrift plan contribt.tions, company paid health insuranc. plans,
and restricted clock awards that are vested or released from restrictions. The dollar value of these other payment. is
n.b.tantially less than the salary and bonus that a CEO receives. None of our results changed significantly when we
included these other payments in our compensation variable. However, in the case of banks, Forbes has compensation data
on a substantially lees number of banks those who file with the Secu,itis and Exchange Comminion (SEC). Accordingly,
in .11 Our analysi, we restrict Qur tat. to th. compensation data from tIre annual bank proxystatementsmed with the
SEC.11
dummy variable (IS) assumes the value of unity if the state in which the bank is located
has very restrictive interstate banking laws. Such states would restrict their banks from to
being acquired by an out-of-state bank, belong to interstate regional pacts, or to practice
some form of national banking. Values for these interstate variables are not constant over
the ten-year period studied, as many states moved toward less restrictive regulation. We
also create the interaction variable between performance and interstate regulation, IS *
SW.As explained in Section 3, we expect the signs on IS, and IS *SW,to be negative
under the managerial talent hypothesis.
To control for possible bank size effects, we indude the asset size of the bank in the
current year AS. Note that when we enter this variable as an independent variable in the
panel regressions, it tests whether fast-growing banks have CEOs with higher levels of
compensation. Consequently, to test whether, ccteris paribtza, large banks have CEOs with
higher levels of compensation, we regress the estimated fixed-effects on the average asset
size of a bank.
5. Empirical tests and results
We begin our empirical tests by examining whether CEO compensation increased
following the relaxation of restrictive interstate banking legislation. Sample averages of the
three components of compensation (salary and bonus, equity ownership in the bank, and
the value of stock options) before and after regulatory liberalization are presented in Table
2.
We find that all three components of total real compensation increased significantly
after deregulation. These differences in compensation before and after deregulation are
statistically significant. More importantly, the percentage of total compensation in the
form of performance-related compensation (i.e., equity ownership and options) increased
significantly after restrictive interstate banking legislation was relaxed. These results
provide preliminary evidence that interstate banking affected both the level and the
structure of compensation, commensurate with the managerial talent hypothesis.
To consider the managerial talent hypothesis more carefully, we examine CEO
turnover before and after deregulation. Using the 125 banks for which CEO data are
completely available, we find that 21 banks experienced changes in CEO in the three years12
beforeinterstate banking was legislated, resulting in a turnover rate (defined as the
percentage of banks where CEO changes occurred divided by the total number of banks
where dataisavailable) of 16.8 percent. We attribute this rate as the normal turnover
rate due to factors other than the relaxation of restrictive interstate regulation. We find
that the number of banks whose CEOs changed in the three years after interstate banking
deregulation jumped to 49; an increase of 133 percent. The higher turnover ratio of 39.2
percent also confirms that turnover increased after deregulation, in support of the
managerial talent hypothesis. Since interstate banking deregulation occurred at different
periods for the banks in the sample, the possibility that increased turnover is due to some
macroeconomic trend is remote.
Our estimation strategy is as follows: We estimate panel regressions'2 of compensation
on managerial performance (that is, shareholder wealth SW)andinterstate banking
regulation. Compensation is initially defined as salary and bonus, and then broadened to
include equity ownership in the bank and stock options. In panel A of Table 4, we control
for bank-specific omitted variables. We find shareholder wealth to be positive and
statistically significant at the one-percent level, consistent with Jensen and Murphy
(1990a), Barro and Barro (1992), Murphy (1985) and Houston and James (1992). This
coefficient of 0.129 translates to 1.29 cents increase in a bank CEO's salary and bonus per
$1,000 increase in bank shareholder wealth, consistent with the Jensen and Murphy
(1990a) result of 1.35 cents change in a firm CEO's salary and bonus per $1,000 increase in
finn performance. We then include the dummy variable for restrictive interstate banking
regulation (IS) as a regressor, and find that it is negatively related to compensation at the
one-percent significance level. Including bank assets (AS) does not change any of our
results (although the statistically significance of the estimated AS coefficient suggests that
more rapidly growing banks have CEOs with higher salary and bonus packages). We next
use the more comprehensive definition of total compensation as our dependent variable
13Civen thelongitudinalnasun of our data we tat if panel regressions (the fixed-effectsorrandom-effect. model.)
Snmoreefficient to use in our samplethanpooling the data and using OhS. Specifically, we perform en F-tnt on the
restriction of equal intercepts at the group1e.L mi.striction is rejected at the five-percentlevel(or all our
specifications, suggestingthatthe fixed-effect. model does better than running OhS on the pooleddata. We also conduct
Breu.chand Pagan's (1980)Lagrangemultipliertest andfind that the random-effect, model also don better than 01.5 on
thepooled data. Wetestwhich of thesetwopanel estimation techniques (fixed-effects or random-effects)shouldweuse by
conductingHausman end Taylor'. (1981) specification test. Using the Weldaiterion,theysuggestthat the covariance of
anefficient estimatorwithitsdifference fro,n an inefficient estimator, is rem. Wefindevidence in supportof the fixed-
effectsprocedureoverthe random-effects procedure.Accordingly, wealwaysuse the fixed-effects technique.13
andfind that shareholderwealth hasa larger coefficient and is still positivelyrelatedto
compensation. The interstate banking dummy variable IS is still negatively related to
compensation. These results support the managerial talent hypothesis, wherein restrictive
banking environments have CEOs with lower levels of compensation.
Itis certain that the higher levels of compensation in deregulated banking
environments is due partially to a time trend, since most of the states were without
interstate banking in 1980, and had converted to interstate banking by 1989. We allow for
this possibility by estimating a fixed-effects model where the intercept term not only
includes bank-specific effects but year dummies. The results of this experiment are
presented in panel B of Table 4. We find that none of our results changed dramatically,
although the i-statistics associated with our variables decreased. However, we find that
fast.growing banks still have a positive relationship to their CEO's salary and bonus levels
but not to their CEO's total compensation.
In the tests describes thus far, we used bank ettects as our group stratification variable,
allowing us to control for omitted variables that are specific to the bank. This procedure
ignores the fact that different CEOs might have managed the bank over the sample
period, so that the calculated mean differences in compensation abstract from the
differences between the old and new CEOs. Accordingly, we re-estimate our previous
model controlling for CEO-specific omitted variables. We use the sample (described in
Table 3) in which there were no CEO changes three years before and after interstate
banking was deregulated. This allows us to get sufficient number of years for each CEO,
resulting in a sample of 55 bank CEOs. We re-estimate the specifications reported in
Table 4, the results of which are given in Table 5. These results suggest that shareholder
wealth is still positively related to compensation. In addition, the presence of restrictive
interstate banking regulation is negatively and significantly related to compensation when
we control for CEO-specific effects. Introducing year dummies changes none of our results
when compensation is defined as salary and bonus. When we use total compensation as
the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients on interstate banking dummies remain
negative and are precisely estimated.
Next, we estimate the effect of loosening restrictive interstate banking laws on the14
relationship between CEO compensation and bank performance. To do this, we construct
an interaction variable between shareholder wealth and the dummy for restrictive
interstate banking regulation. The results of this experiment are presented in Table 6
(controlling for bank-specific omitted variables) and Table 7 (controlling for CEO-specific
omitted variables).
Shareholder wealth remains positively related to compensation, whether compensation
is defined as salary and bonus, or defined as total compensation. Moreover, the interaction
term between shareholder wealth and restrictive interstate banking regulation is negative
and statistically significant. This result is robust to a specification in which year dummies
are included. When we control for CEO-specific omitted variables, we find that the
negative effect of restrictive interstate banking regulation on the compensation-
performance relationship still holds.13 Consequently, we find evidence that deregulating
restrictiveinterstate banking legislation strengthensthe relationship between
compensation and performance.
To summarize, we find evidence that higher levels of compensation, higher turnover,
and higher pay-performance sensitivities accompanying the deregulation of restrictive
interstate banking legislation, consistent with the managerial talent hypothesis. These
results of a stronger compensation-performance relationship in deregulated banking
environments are inconsistent with the predictions of the "risk-differential hypothesis"
described in Section 2.
Effect of asset size on CEO compensation
To test whether compensation is related to asset size, all other things being equal, we
obtained the fixed-effects estimators from our previous estimation procedures. We do not
choose specifications in which AS already appears as an regressor so as to avoid any
spurious correlations. We also use the fixed-effects estimators that are constant for each
bank, or constant for each CEO, but not include year d,,mmies. The relevant subset of our
specifications that we use is presented in the first column of Table 8. The average asset
13We also e.timated alternative .pecilication. that included both the regulation variable (IS)andthe interaction of
shareholder wealth with regulation variable(SW • IS). Inmany such specifications, the interaction tenn is imPreCisely
estimated, suggesting that the regulation variable may be more important than the interaction variable.15
sizeof a bankduringthe sample period is then regressed on the intercept term obtained
from the fixed-effects estimation. The results of this experiment are given in Table 8.
We find strong evidence that asset size is related to compensation, cetethparibus,
whethercompensation is defined as salary and bonus or total compensation. These results
are consistent with the hierarchal hypothesis of Rosen (1982), wherein larger firms have
senior executives whose managerial productivity of actions is magnified over a bigger scale
of operations. The explanatory power of bank asset size is much higher in explaining
variations in compensation when compensation includes only salary and bonus, and not
other performance-enhancing components such as equity ownership and stock options.
6.Conclusions
The business press and the legislative process have focused much attention on the
"excessive" pay of CEOs. Indeed, many proposals have been made to introduce regulation
limiting CEO pay. In contrast, Jensen and Murphy (1990a, 1990b) have observed that the
lack of any large correlation between pay and performance can be attributed to some form
of implicit regulation (i.e., the political forces present in the public sector and in
organizations that truncate the upper tail of the compensation distribution which should
be awarded to exceptional managers). They suggest that to align managerial incentives
with shareholders' interests, caps on managerial salaries should not be considered; the pay-
performance sensitivity should be enhanced to properly reward the better-performing
managers.
Using the banking industry, in which interstate regulations allow relatively straight-
forward identification of varying corporate control environments, we examine panel data
on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s. We find both higher levels of CEO
compensation and a stronger compensation-performance relationship in competitive
corporate control environments (in which interstate banking is permitted) than for CEOs
in environments in which interstate banking is not permitted. This result is robust to
controlling for omitted variables at the CEO-specific or bank-specific level. In addition, we
find that CEO turnover increases substantially alter interstate banking deregulation.
While such results must be interpreted with caution, they are consistent with the idea
that restricting pay levels of chief executive officers would reduce the effectiveness of a
well-functioning managerial labor market and its associated compensation structure to
attract talented managers to challenging careers. We also find evidence that the size of the16
bankis positively related to the level of compensation.
In future work, we plan to examine family-controlled banks and the differences in CEO
compensation of these banks from our current sample. However, such an analysis requires
data on much smaller banks which might or might not be traded. Consequently,
shareholder performance measures that invoLve modifying accounting data would likely be
appropriate. -17
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Bank of Boston Corp.
Bank of New England Corp.
Bank of New York Inc.
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Name of Bank State Year° Name of Dank State Yea?






Alabama 1987 Fifth Third Bancorp Ohio 1985
Arizona 1986 First Alabama Bancshares Alabama 1987
N. Carolina 1985 Fiat American Corp. Tennessee 1985
California 1987 First Dancorp of Ohio Ohio 1985
Maryland 1985 Fiat Dank Systems Inc. Minnesota 1986
Ohio 1985 First Chicago Corp. Illinois 1984
Oklahoma 1987 First Citizens Baacshare Inc. N. Carolina 1985
Hawaii 1988 First City Bancorp Texas Inc. Texas 1987
Texas 1987 First Commerce Corp. Louisiana 1987
Massachusetts 1983 First Empire State Corp. New York 1982
Massachusetts 1983 First Federal Bank Alabama 1987
New York 1982 First Fidelity Bancorp New Jersey 1986
Co.Caiifornia 1981 Fiat Florida Banks Inc. Florida 1985
Georgia 1985 Fins Hawaiian Inc. Hawaii 1988
California 1987 First laterstate Baacorp California 1987
New York 1982 First Maryland Baacorp Maryland 1985
Florida 1985 First National Cincinnati Corp. Ohio 1985
Massacbusett. 1983 Fiat National Corp. California 1987
Missouri 1986 Fiat of America Bancorp Michigan 1986
Georgia 1985 Fiat Pennsylvania Corp. Pennsylvania1986
California 1987 Fiat Republic Bancorp Texas 1981
Massachusetts 1983 First Security Corp. Utah 1984
New York 1982 First Tennessee National Corp.Tennessee 1985
New York 1982 First Union Corp. N. Carolina 1985
New York 1982 First Virginia Bank. Inc. Virginia 1985
New Jersey 1986 First Wachovia Corp. N. Carolina 1985
Virginia 1985 Fiat Wisconsin Corp. Wisconsin 1987
Georgia 1985 Fleet Financial Group Inc. Rhode Island1984
California 1987 florida National Banks Florida 1985
Connecticut 1983 Fourth Financial Corp. Kansas 1989
Colorado 1988 Hibernia Louisiana 1987
Michigan 1986 BUBCO New Jersey 1986
Missouri 1986 Huntington Bancahares Inc. Ohio 1985
New Jersey 1986 Indiana National Corp. Indiana 1986
New York 1982 Interchange Financial New Jersey 1986
Illinois 1984 International Bank D. Columbia 1985
Pennsylvania1986 J.P. Morgan & Co. New York 1082
Virginia 1985 Key Corp New York 1982
Texas 1987 La Jolla Bancorp California 1987
Pennsylvania1986 Landmark Bancsbares Corp. Missouri 1986
Mississippi 1988 Liberty National Bancorp Kentucky 1984
Virginia 1985 M N C Financial Inc. Maryland 1985
California 1987 Manufacturers Nat'l Corp. Michigan 198618
Table 1 (continued)
Name of Bank State Year° Name of Bank State Yenta
Marshall £c Haley Corp. Wisconsin 1987 Security PscilIc Corp. California 1987
Mellon Bancorp Pennsylvania1986 Sbawznut National Corp. Connecticut 1983
Mercantile Bancorp Inc. Missouri 1986 Signet Banking Corp. Virginia 1985
Mercantile Bancahares Corp. Maryland 1985 S. Carolina National Corp. S. Carolina 1986
Merchants Bank New York 1982 Southeast Banking Corp. Florida 1985
Merchant, National Corp. Indiana 1988 Southern National Corp. N. Carolina 1985
Meridian Bancorp Pennsylvania1986 Southtrust Corp. Alabama 1987
Michigan National Corp. Michigan 1986 Southwest Bancorp California 1987
Midlantic Corp. New Jersey 1986 Soyran Financial Corp. Virginia 1985
Moore Financial Group Idaho 1985 Standard Federal Bank Michigan 1986
Multibarak Financial Corp. Massachusetts1983 State Street Boston Corp. Massacbusetta1983
N B D Bancorp Michigan 1988 Sterling Baacorp New York 1982
NCNB Corp. N. Carolina 1985 Suntrust Banks Inc. Georgia 1985
National Bancshares Corp. Texas 1987 Texas American Bancsharn Inc.Texas 1987
Nat1onai City Corp. Ohio 1985 Texas Commerce Baacshares Texas 1987
North Fork Corp. New York 1982 Toledo Trust Corp. Ohio 1985
Northeast Bancorp Inc. Connecticut 1983 U I B Financial Corp. New Jersey 1986
Northern Trust Corp. Illinois 1984 United Banks Colorado Colorado 1988
Old Kent Financial Corp. Michigan 1986 United Missouri Baacshares Inc.Missouri 1986
F N C Financial Corp. Pennsylvania1986 United Stain Bancorp Oregon 1986
Pacific Western Bancshares California 1987 United Stain Trust Corp. New York 1982
Penn Bancorp PennsylvanIa1986 University Bank Massachusetts1983


























Seattle Bank Washington 1987
Source, Gotembe and Holland (1986) and Aznel (1991).19
Table2
Sample averages of components of CEOcompensationand tests for differences in these components before









Salary and bonus 393.35 551.80 (-10.32)°
Equity ownership 3489.50 5816.60 (-2.70)°
Options granted 133.52 190.28 (_2.09)t
Percentage of totalcompen-




aSigniucant at the 1% level.
bsigninnt at the 5% level.20
Table 3
CEO turnover before and after interstate banking was legislated
Total number oi banks in sample 147
Banks for which data on the number 22
of years the bank executive has been
CEO are missing
Total numberofbanks for which data 125
on the number of years executive has
been CEO are available
Numberof banksfor which CEO changes 49
occurred inthethree years after inter-
statelegislation was introduced
Numberof banks for which CEO changes 21
occurred in the three years before inter-
state legislation was introduced
Number of banks for which CEO changes 55
did not occur in the three years before
and after interstate legislation was
introduced
Turnover ratio0 in the three years alter 39.2%
interstate legislation was introduced
Turnover ratio0 in the three years before 16.8%
interstate legislation was introduced
Number of banks with no CEO turnover 44.0%
in the three years before and after inter-
state legislation was introduced
°Turnover ratio is defined as the percentage of banks in which CEO changes occurred
divided by the total number of banks where data are available.21
Table 4
Bank-specific (fixed-effects) estimation of the effect of interstate regulation on the level of CEO
compensation for 147 banks during 1980 to 1989.
The dependent variableisCEO compensation, defined as thedollar value ofsalary and bonus in thefirst
three columns, and thedollar value ofsalary, bonus, equity owned in the bank, and options granted in
the last three columns. All CEO compensation is expressed in thousands of dollars. Shareholder wealth is
defined as the stock returns earned during the year, times the price at the beginning of the year, times the
number of shares outstanding, and is expressed in millions of dollars. The asset size of the bank is
expressedinhundreds of millions of dollars. All monetary variables are reported in constant (1989)
dollars. t-statisticsare in parentheses.
Regressors
Panel A : Controlling for bank-specific omitted variables





0.119 0.124 2.912 2.834 2.886






— -177.50 -169.32 — -2173.8 -198$.!
(_19.016)a (_17.835)a (-5.o13)° (-4.465)°
Asset size
(AS)
— — 0.115 — — 2.845
(3.981)° (l.799)c
2 0.566 0.676 0.681 0.794 0.799 0.800
Regressors
PanelB Controlling forbank-specificomittedvariablesandyear-effects





0.099 0.101 2.153 2.133 2.166










— — 0.056 — — 1.188
(2.032)6 (0.731)
K2 0.730 0.731 0.732 0.799 0.801 0.802
°Signiflcant at the 1% level.
6Significant at the 5% level.
csigninnt at the 10% level.
dTheestimatedyear-effects are notreported.22
Table 5
CEO-specific(fixed-effects) estimation of the effect of interstate regulation on the levelofCEO
compensation for 55 banks during 1980 to 1989.
The dependent variableis CEO compensation, defined as the dollar value of salary and bonus in
thefirst three columns, and the dollar value of salary, bonus, equity owned in the bank, and
optionsgranted in the last three columns. All CEO compensation is expressed in thousands of
dollars.Shareholderwealth is defined as the stock returnsearnedduring the year, times the price
at the beginningofthe year,times thenumber of shares outstanding,andis expressed inmillions
of dollars.The asset size ofthe bank is expressed inhundredsofmillionsofdollars.Allmonetary
variables arereported in constant(1989) dollars. t-statisticsare in parentheses.
Regressors
Panel A: Controlling for CEO-specific omitted variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (e)
Shareholder 0.138 0.124 0.121 6.505 6.513 6.447
wealth (SW) (3.026)' (3.705)' (3.654)' (3.161)' (3.198)' (3.165)'
Dummy equal to
unityforrestr-
— -191.20 -182.25 — -2594.5 -2296.0




Asset size — — 0.115 — — 3.775
(AS) (2.395)b (1.155)
2 0.655 0.713 0.716 0.824 0.828 0.828
Regressors
PanelB: Controlling forCEO-specific omitted variables and year-effectS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shareholder 0.101 0.096 0.088 5.339 5.326 5.334
wealth (SW) (2.999)' (2.593)' (2.712)6 (2.351)6 (2.349)6 (2.351)'
Dummy equal to — -22.897 -41.245 — -2123.1 -2022.8




Asset size — — 0.006 — — 2.420
(AS) (1.435) (0.690)
R 0.700 0.702 0.766 0.816 0.817 0.816
'Significant at the 1% level.
6Signiflcant at the 5% level.
'Significant at the10%level.
dTheestimated year-effects are not reported.23
Table 6
Bank-specific (fixed-effects) estimation of the effect of interstate regulation on the relationship
between CEO compensation and bank performance for 147 banks during 1980 to 1989.
The dependent variable is CEO compensation, defined as the dollar value of salary and bonus in
the first two columns,andthe dollar value of salary, bonus, equity owned in the bank, and
options granted in the next two columns. All CEO compensation is expressed in thousands of
dollars. Shareholder wealth is defined as the stock returns earned during the year, times the price
at the beginning of the year, times the number of shares outstanding, and is expressed in millions
of dollars. The asset size of the bank is expressed in hundreds of millions of dollars. All monetary
variables are reported in constant (1989) dollars. t—statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A Controlling for bank-specific omitted variables
Regrors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shareholder wealth (SW) 0.169 0.175 3.364 3.377
(7967) (8.422)a (4.033)a(4.o64)
Shareholder wealth (SW)timesthe -0.286 -0.271 -3.088 -3.001
dummyforrestrictive interstate (-5.900)° (.5.707)° (_7.636)n(-6.751)°
regulation (IS)
Asset Bize (AS) — 0.219 — 4.321
(6.876)° (2.775)a
0.579 0.597 0.794 0.795
Panel B : Controlling for bank-specific omitted variables and year-effects'
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shareholder wealth (SW) 0.104 0.107 2.289 2.321
(5.670)° (5229)° (2.566)6 (2.598)a
Shareholder wealth (SW) times the -0j35 -0.134 -2.547 -2.432
dummy for restrictive interstate (_2.046)6 (-L83Sf (2.650)° (2.321)6
regulation (IS)
Asset size (AS) — 0.056 — 1.207
(2.06 1)6 (0.742)
0.730 0.731 0.799 0.799
at the 1% level.
6Significant at the 5% level.
CSiiraat at the 10% level.
'The estimated year-effects are not reported.24
Table7
CEO-specific(fixed-effects) panel estimation of the effect of interstate regulation on the
reiationship between CEO compensation and bank performance for 55 banks during 1980 to 1989.
The dependent variable is CEO compensation, defined as the dollar value of salary and bonus in
the first two columns,andthe dollar value of salary, bonus, equity owned in the bank, and
options granted in the nat two columns. All CEO compensation is expressed in thousands of
dollars. Shareholder wealth is defined as the stock returns earned during the year, times the price
at the beginning of the year, times the number of shares outstanding, and is expressed in millions
of dollars. The asset size of the bank is expressed in hundreds of millions of dollars. All monetary
variables are reported in constant (1989) dollars. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A Controlling for CEO-specific omitted variables
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shareholder wealth (SW) 0.159 0.150 6.708 6.355
(3.929) (3.820)° (3.204)a (3.348)°
Shareholder wealth (SW) times the -0.413 -0.378 -2.653 -2-717
dummy for restrictive interstate (_4.190)a (_3.934)4 (_5.315)a (_5.289)a
regulation (IS)
Asset size (AS) — 0.269 — 5.921
(4.995)a (i.872f
A 2 0.596 0.617 0.824 0.825
Panel B Controlling for CEO-specific omitted variables and year-effecté
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 427.78 436.37 70844 6818.1
(39.32) (66.12g)a (14.699)(12.122)a
Shareholder wealth (SW) 0.128 0.091 5.305 5.104
(2.339)' (2.728) (2.309)' (2.126)'
Shareholder wealth (SW) times the -0.148 -0.142 -2.615 -2.322
dummy for restrictive interstate (.2.100)b (-L998)6 (.2.103)b (-1.999)'
regulation (IS)
Asset size (As) — 0.025 — 2.916
(0.072) (0.834)
ft2 0.755 0.731 0.826 0.827
"Significant at the 1% level.
'Significant at the 5% level.
CSignificant at the 10% level.
dThe estimated year-effects are not reported.25
Table $
OLSregressionof the fixed-effectson bankasset size.
Thedependent variableis the estimated fixed-effects foreachbank in PanelA,and (or each CEO
inPanel B. The independent variable is the average assetsize of the bank, and is expressed in
hundreds of millions of dollars. All monetary variables are reported in constant (1989) dollars. t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Specification
Panel A Controlling for bank-specific omitted variables




















0.868 0.330 602.33 5.717 0.127
(24.347)" (3.551)" (3.800)"
Specification
Panel B Controlling (or CEO-specific omitted variables




















2.021 0.510 783.80 18.498 0.179
(22.723)" (2.049)" (2.993)"
"Significant atthe 1% level.
"Significant at the 5% level.
CSignificant at the 10% level.26
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